IPO initial returns reached astronomical levels during 1999-2000. We show that the regime shift in initial returns and other elements of pricing behavior can be at least partially accounted for by a variety of marked changes in pre-IPO ownership structure and insider selling behavior over the period, which reduced key decision-makers' incentives to control underpricing. After controlling for these changes, the difference in underpricing between 1999-2000 and the preceding three years is much reduced. Our results suggest that it was firm characteristics that were unique during the "dot-com bubble" and that pricing behavior followed from incentives created by these characteristics.
In 1996, first-day returns on IPOs averaged about 17 percent (median: ten percent). In 1999, first-day returns averaged 73 percent (median: 40 percent) before tapering off to 58 percent (median: 30 percent) in 2000. Internet IPOs averaged a stunning 89 percent (median: 57 percent) during 1999 and 2000. These average returns dwarf those from earlier periods and are the most widely recognized feature of what is now commonly referred to as the "dot-com bubble".
Existing explanations for the initial return behavior of IPOs focus in large part on informational frictions that arise among the various parties to the transaction. 1 Although it is conceivable that informational frictions became more severe during the dot-com bubble, it strains belief that even collectively this body of theory can account for the profound change in market behavior. With this in mind, Loughran and Ritter (2001) conjecture that issuers grew complacent as valuations spiraled, thereby heightening the agency conflict between issuers and their banks modeled by Baron (1982) and Biais, Bossaerts, and Rochet (2002) . In this paper, we document profound changes in the incentive structure surrounding the IPOs of 1999 and 2000 that go well beyond spiraling valuations.
For example, in 1996 pre-IPO insider ownership stakes averaged 63.9 percent but by 2000 had declined to 51.8 percent. CEO stakes declined even more dramatically, halving from 22.7 percent to 11.6 percent. Similarly, equity stakes held by VCs and investment banks, as well as those held by other corporations, declined sharply in magnitude over the period. As a consequence, ownership became increasingly fragmented. Alongside these changes in ownership structure, 1999-2000 witnessed a sharp decline in both the frequency and magnitude of secondary sales of existing shares by all categories of pre-IPO owners, and especially CEOs. Finally, directed share programs -which provide family, friends, employees, suppliers, and occasionally VCs the opportunity to purchase shares at the IPO price -appeared in only 24.7 percent of IPOs marketed in 1996, but 79.2 percent in 1999 and 92.6 percent in 2000.
Standard principal-agent theories predict that agents will expend less effort in bargaining and monitoring on behalf of their principals when the agents' stake in the transaction is smaller. Thus the observed changes in ownership structure and selling behavior should undermine the incentives of those most directly involved in bargaining over the offer price. We test this hypothesis in a structural model of initial returns and price revisions between the IPO registration and offer dates.
Initial returns are larger when insider ownership stakes are smaller and more fragmented and when insiders sell fewer shares at the offer price. Similarly, when CEOs and venture capitalists sell fewer shares in the IPO, price revisions, which we interpret as a measure of information acquired during the selling effort, are less aggressive. Thus, our results indicate a strong association between the aberrant pricing of the dot-com bubble and changes in ownership structure and insider selling behavior.
Controlling for insider ownership and sales increases substantially the explanatory power of our regressions and accounts for a good deal of what apparently set issuers during the dot-com bubble apart from their predecessors. For example, in the underpricing regressions, dummy variable coefficients associated with high-tech and internet firms decline by more than 60 percent (but remain statistically significant) from estimates obtained without controlling for changes in ownership structure and secondary selling behavior. Similarly, the dummy variable coefficient for the "bubble" years 1999 and 2000 declines by more than a half.
These findings are robust to a variety of alternative specifications. Among other things, we have allowed for several sources of potential endogeneity bias and considered whether there is sufficient information to separately identify firm-specific effects and those associated with the bubble dummy variable. Our central conclusion does not change. In sum, both price revisions and underpricing during the dot-com bubble, although profoundly aberrant from a historical perspective, can be at least partially explained by equally profound changes in pre-IPO ownership structure and insider selling behavior.
I. Sample and Data
The sample consists of firms completing an initial public offering between January 1996 and December 2000. Thomson Financial's SDC database lists 2,178 completed IPOs for that period, after excluding unit offers, closed-end funds (including REITs), financial institutions, ADRs of companies already listed in their home countries, limited partnerships, and penny stocks (IPOs with offer prices below five dollars). 2 We have prospectuses for all 2,178 sample IPOs. Most IPO prospectuses since early May 1996 are available on the S.E.C. Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) service. Prospectuses for issues in January-April 1996 and for foreign issuers (who do not have to file electronically with EDGAR) are obtained directly from the firms, from Disclosure's Global Access, and in the case of Canadian issuers, from the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR).
Ideally, the sample would extend further back in time. Given the difficulty of compiling prospectus data prior to 1996, we provide one historical reference point by obtaining prospectuses for the 185 firms that, according to SDC, completed a bona fide IPO during the fourth quarter of 1993. We refer to this set of firms as the 93Q4 reference sample.
Finally, we summarize withdrawal patterns over the period by assembling an SDC-generated sample of 748 firms that withdrew their offerings in 1996-2000.
SDC contains little information on ownership structure, so we hand-collect data on CEO, VC, investment bank, and corporate ownership from prospectuses. We classify stakes held by a VC fund affiliated with an investment bank as an investment bank-held stake. We use Pratt's Guide to Venture Capital Sources, the Venture Economics database, and VCs' web sites to identify investment bank-affiliated VC organizations. In addition, investment bank ownership also includes stakes held by the bank directly. We also identify whether the relevant bank is a member of the underwriting syndicate. Data on the incidence and size of directed share programs also is collected from the issuers' prospectuses.
There are significant errors in SDC's variables for venture-backing, syndicate size, shares outstanding pre-and post-IPO, aggregate insider equity holdings pre-and post-IPO, earnings per share before the IPO, and use of proceeds, so we hand-collect these variables as well. 3 We use some SDC accounting data (the book values of assets and equity, revenue, and net income) purely for illustrative purposes. These have only been checked for outliers.
Internet companies are identified as in Loughran and Ritter (2001) , with slight modifications.
For the withdrawn offerings, internet companies are identified on the basis of SDC's business descriptions. High-tech firms are identified following Loughran and Ritter's classification.
We hand-fill gaps in SDC's coverage of company founding dates and manually check all firms that according to SDC were 0-3 years old at the IPO, since Loughran and Ritter (2001) note that SDC frequently reports the most recent incorporation date rather than the founding date. As in Loughran and Ritter (2001) , the founding date is defined as the date when operations commenced.
In IPOs of corporate divisions, we attempted to determine the date when the division commenced operations. This date normally precedes the date of the division's incorporation. In roll-ups and similar acquisition-based IPOs, the founding date of the IPO company is the earliest founding date of any of its constituent firms. First-day trading prices are generally from CRSP. 183 sample firms are not covered in CRSP, so we use the prices reported in SDC and verify them against news sources and the share price database on bigcharts.com. Table II, the number of lead and co-lead   underwriters (SDC variable NUMMGR) 
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II. How Issuing Firms Changed Between 1996 and 2000
A. Firm Characteristics
B. Transaction Characteristics
C. Changes in the Pre-IPO Ownership Structure of Issuing Firms
The S.E.C. requires issuers to disclose, in their prospectus, the beneficial ownership of common stock by directors, director nominees, and executive officers, as well as every selling shareholder and each person or entity with an equity stake exceeding five percent of the outstanding stock. 8 Conditional on having a bank-held stake, the mean stake size ranged from 22.1 percent in 1997 to 10.5 percent in 1999, with a sample mean of 14.5 percent. Though not monotonic, there is a negative trend in the mean stake size over the period that is significant at the one percent level.
When an investment bank is a shareholder, it usually, but not always, acts as an underwriter.
The frequency with which this occurred peaked at just under 80 percent in 1999 and 2000. NASD Conduct Rule 2720 requires the appointment of a "qualified independent underwriter" (QUI) in cases where one of the lead underwriters is a beneficial owner of ten percent or more of any of an issuer's class of outstanding securities or is participating in the distribution of an affiliate's shares.
(The definition of an affiliate includes, for instance, parent companies.) The QUI's role is to perform due diligence on the company, review and participate in the preparation of the prospectus and registration statement, and recommend a maximum price for the offering to mitigate fears of overpricing.
Across the entire sample, 1,191 of the 2,178 IPOs were backed by (non-investment bank affiliated) venture capital or private equity funds. We refer to these collectively as VC-backed
IPOs. In 1996-1998, VC-backed companies accounted for less than half the sample. By contrast, 
D. Changes in Insider Selling Behavior and Post-IPO Ownership Structure
Table IV summarizes a sharp decline in the frequency of insider sales over the sample period. 
III. The Determinants of Price Revisions and Underpricing
In this section we examine the influence of changes in pre-IPO ownership structure and insider selling behavior on the price revision process and initial returns during the dot-com bubble. We use ordinary least squares to provide a benchmark estimation of each model. We later allow for possible reverse causality and potential endogeneity of several key explanatory variables. The structure of our empirical model is based on the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) paradigm. shares. Thus, underwriters only "partially adjust" the offer price to the information they acquire.
Other things equal, revelation of more favorable information requires a greater inducement, implying a positive relation between price revisions and initial returns of the sort first observed by Hanley (1993). 12 From this perspective the mean of the indicative price range is interpreted as an unconditional expectation of the issuer's share value, with the offer price then a conditional estimate.
Other things equal, insiders should bargain for more aggressive positive revisions when their stakes are larger and more concentrated and when they are selling more secondary shares in the IPO. Thus we predict a positive relation between price revisions and the various measures of insider ownership stakes and concentration and a positive relation between price revisions and measures of insider sales. We attempt to isolate these effects by controlling for firm and offer characteristics.
We also control for valuation-relevant information that comes to light during a company's bookbuilding phase. Specifically, we conjecture that relevant information may spill over from the secondary market and from the bookbuilding experiences of contemporaneous offerings. We attempt to capture the former by including the return on a share price index, measured from the filing date to the effective date of the offering. We use an industry-specific index to isolate information spilling over from firms sharing a common valuation factor with the issuing firm. The industry index is computed as the equally-weighted return on firms in a particular Fama-French (1997) industry, 13 using the universe of firms available in CRSP.
Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (2002) argue that price revisions incorporate information spilling over from the bookbuilding efforts of the issuer's contemporaries in the primary market. The coefficients estimated for contemporaneous underpricing and the industry return are highly significant (p<0.001) and suggest a large economic influence over price revisions. A twoquartile increase in mean underpricing among contemporaneous offerings, from the first to the third quartile, translates into an increase in the issuer's price revision from 2 percent to 8.1 percent, holding all other covariates in model (4) at their sample means. In other words, we observe substantially more aggressive pricing when the issuer's contemporaries are enthusiastically received by investors and therefore suffer more severe underpricing. Similarly, a corresponding increase in the industry return translates into an increase in the issuer's price revision from 2.7 percent to 7.4 percent. Although not reported in Table V , a market-wide index (the equally-weighted combined CRSP index) has no additional explanatory power in the models estimated.
Price revisions are inversely related to the log of the issuing firm's age (p<0.068 or better across the four models) and larger for high-tech (p<0.04) or internet-related firms (p<0.001). Our interpretation of these variables is that younger firms and "new economy" firms suffer greater (2002)). However, if we control separately for the log of the filing amount (not shown), we continue to find a significant and negative relation between syndicate size and price revisions.
In Table II , we showed that price revisions were substantially larger in 1999 and 2000. In the regressions of Table V , the statistical insignificance of the (bubble) dummy variable for the years 1999 and 2000 indicates that changes in firm and offer characteristics and in insider selling behavior can fully explain the time series patterns in price revisions in Table II . In other words, we find no evidence that price revisions during the dot-com bubble behaved differently after controlling for other factors.
Self-selection bias may cause the coefficients estimated for the effect of bank reputation on the extent of price revisions in models (1)- (4) Higher-quality underwriters may enable insiders, such as the CEO, to sell more equity in the IPO, perhaps because their certification ability allows the insiders to sell more shares without negative repercussions. If an underwriter's certification ability is well-known, then it seems reasonable that insiders who intend to sell more equity will take certification ability into account when making their choice of underwriter. We therefore treat insider sales as exogenous in the underwriter choice model. We find that CEO sales are positively associated with higher-ranked underwriters (p=0.025), consistent with the hypothesis that CEOs take a greater interest in the quality of their lead manager when they sell stock in the IPO. VC sales, on the other hand, have a negative association with underwriter reputation (p=0.002). This is consistent with anecdotal evidence that top underwriters frequently dissuade VCs from selling at the IPO.
The coefficient estimated for the bubble dummy is not significant (p=0.422). This contrasts with the univariate results in Table II indicating a trend towards more prestigious underwriters over the period. The multivariate results in Table V suggest that the main cause of this trend is an increase over time in the type of issuer that benefits from choosing a more prestigious underwriter.
Using the predicted investment bank rankings from (5) as instruments, model (6) provides consistent estimates of the effect of underwriter reputation on price revisions. Comparing columns (4) and (6) indicates that controlling for selection has the predicted effect of reducing the bank reputation coefficient (by a third). However, the bank coefficient remains highly significant (p=0.019) and positive, so higher-ranked banks are still associated with greater price revisions, after controlling for the endogeneity of bank choice. This finding does not support the notion that top-ranked underwriters deliberately exploited naïve or complacent issuers, unless greater price revisions reflect low-balling in the setting of the price range rather than price discovery. 17 Note also that the significance of the VC sales coefficient in the price revisions model increases to p<0.05 when underwriter choice is treated as endogenous.
B. Underpricing
As a starting point for the underpricing analysis, we estimate a simple regression of initial returns on dummy variables for high-tech and internet firms and the bubble years 1999-2000: Table VI reports the least-squares estimates of four models, mirroring those in Table V, that again differ in the ownership and insider sales variables while controlling for a fixed set of firm and offer characteristics. In addition to the variables included in the price revision regressions, we introduce several additional firm and offer characteristics based on the univariate results reported in Tables I to IV. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) model the effect of participation and dilution on underpricing and show both theoretically and empirically that initial returns are lower, the more pre-IPO shareholders sell or the greater the increase in shares outstanding as a result of the issuance of primary stock. We therefore control for the participation ratio (the number of secondary shares sold relative to pre-IPO shares outstanding) and the dilution factor (the number of primary shares sold relative to pre-IPO shares outstanding). We also conjecture that a directed share program creates an incentive to underprice an offering in order to benefit the targeted clienteles, and thus control for the size and presence of DSPs.
In addition to using log age, we include the intended use of proceeds as a proxy for valuation uncertainty. When issuers plan to use the proceeds to finance operating expenses or working capital, we conjecture, there is greater uncertainty about the financial sustainability of their business model. To capture the partial adjustment phenomenon first documented by Hanley (1993), we include the price revision relative to the midpoint of the filing range, and to allow for possible asymmetries in pricing (Lowry and Schwert (2001)), we include a variable which equals the price revision if it is positive, and zero otherwise.
Once again, the coefficient estimates are stable across all models, reported in columns (7)-(11), and the explanatory power of the regressions is high (R 2 in excess of 45 percent). Among firm characteristics, underpricing is inversely related to the log of the issuing firm's age (p<0.05).
Consistent with the findings of Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), underpricing is inversely related to
the participation ratio (p<0.05 in model 9) and the dilution factor (p=0.066 or better across the models). In other words, underpricing is more severe when current shareholders have less at stake in the level of the offer price. Underpricing increases by about 0.7 percent for every one percent increase in the fraction of the offering set aside for directed share programs (p<0.03). As conjectured, offerings aimed at funding operating expenses are more severely underpriced, by about seven percentage points (p<0.05 or better).
In contrast to the strong effect of investment bank ranking on price revisions, bank reputation does not influence the degree of underpricing, after controlling for other effects. Thus, underwriter quality appears to influence initial returns only indirectly by influencing price revisions. The indirect effect is consistent with the Benveniste-Spindt (1989) framework, for more active and prestigious banks should have more leverage to extract information from investors, leading to more aggressive proceeds revisions. A direct effect would be more nearly consistent with the Carter-Manaster (1990) and Booth-Smith (1986) framework where prestigious underwriters transfer "certification" benefits rather than offer superior information production. The summary data provided earlier illustrated that the frequency and magnitude of secondary sales declined sharply in 1999-2000. Models (7)- (9) include the participation ratio alongside the ownership variables and find a negative association between underpricing and overall secondary sales (normalized by pre-IPO shares outstanding), confirming the earlier results of Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) . In models (10) and (11) we disaggregate the participation ratio into sales by insiders as a group (10) and sales by CEOs, VCs, investment banks, and other corporations (11).
The difference between the overall participation ratio and these disaggregated measures captures sales by other pre-IPO shareholders who are not VCs, banks, or corporations, nor represented on the board (for instance, ESOPs). We expect such "other" pre-IPO shareholders to have less influence on IPO pricing decisions, and therefore predict that the disaggregated measures in (10) and (11) have a larger effect on underpricing than the overall participation ratio used in (7)- (9).
The coefficient estimates bear this out. Underpricing is significantly lower, the greater are sales by insiders as a group (p=0.05 in (10)), and the magnitude of this effect is more than twice that of the overall participation ratio in (7)- (9 Having controlled for the firm and offer characteristics we know to have changed during the dot-com bubble, it is revealing to compare the coefficients estimated for the high-tech, internet, and bubble dummies to their counterparts in the simple regression reported at the beginning of this section. The coefficients for both the high-tech and internet dummy variables, while remaining statistically significant at the five percent level, have now declined by more than 60 percent in magnitude. Similarly, the coefficient for the bubble dummy, after controlling for additional effects, is less than half its former magnitude. In other words, after controlling for firm characteristics, transaction characteristics, ownership structure, and insider selling, the difference in underpricing between the dot-com bubble and the 1996-1998 period is much reduced.
IV. Robustness Tests
A. Reverse Causality
We have interpreted the dramatic decrease in insider sales over the sample period as leading to a reduction in owners' incentives to bargain effectively for a higher offer price. Thus, regressions (10) and (11) treat the insider sales variables as exogenous with respect to underpricing. It is possible, however, that causality runs the other way: owners who expect underpricing to be high, due to the state of the IPO market, may decide to sell fewer or no shares in their IPO. In that case, the insider sales variables are endogenous to expected underpricing and so, possibly, to realized underpricing -the LHS variable in columns (10) and (11) of Table VI . We can thus not be sure that the coefficients reported in (10) and (11) are estimated consistently using OLS. 19 To test for consistency, we perform a Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test (Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) pp. 237f). As an instrument, we use the average initial return of all IPOs in the same Fama-French industry as sample firm i, measured over the three months up to the date of i's first S.E.C. filing. We refer to this variable as lagged underpricing. Given that underpricing is quite persistent over periods of three months (Lowry and Schwert (2001)), this instrument may be a good proxy for the level of underpricing insiders expected when they decided on their secondary sales. Since we only have one instrument, we cannot separately test the consistency of sales by each owner category in (11). Instead, we focus on aggregate insider sales in (10) .
Lagged underpricing has the expected negative effect on insider sales decisions (p=0.004), without being correlated with the residuals of the underpricing regression (10) . 
B. Endogeneity Considerations
The underpricing regressions in models (7)- (11) in Table VI treat both underwriter choice and the degree of price revisions as exogenous. However, estimation of model (5) in Table V suggests that underwriter choice is better treated as endogenous to a firm's characteristics. Moreover, the Benveniste-Spindt framework suggests that price revisions and underpricing be modeled simultaneously: conditional on information revealed during bookbuilding, the underwriter simultaneously determines the offer price (and therefore the price revision) and how much money to leave on the table (the initial return). In this view, large positive revisions reflect the acquisition of considerable information and so map into large initial returns aimed at compensating investors for revealing private information. Therefore, we estimate a two-stage model that treats both underwriter choice and price revisions in the underpricing regression as endogenous. We use the predicted values for underwriter ranks and price revisions from models (5) and (6) in Table V, respectively, in the model (11) specification of the underpricing regression. 20, 21 Column (12) in Table VI reports the results.
A comparison of the OLS coefficients in (11) and the 2SLS coefficients in (12) Of the two price revision terms, only the positive-only term is significant in the 2SLS
estimates. This implies that, controlling for the simultaneity of price revisions and underpricing, underwriters adjust offer prices fully to negative information and partially to positive information.
The primary changes in the 2SLS model concern the coefficients for internet IPOs and the bubble years: both drop sharply in magnitude and neither is significant at five percent or better.
The coefficient on the high-tech dummy doesn't drop by as much but also loses significance at the five percent level. By implication, the significant coefficients estimated for internet and high-tech
IPOs in the OLS model (11) may simply reflect their greater degree of information production (see models (1)-(4) and (6) in Table V ) which in turn has to be "paid for" with increased underpricing.
Controlling for this, internet and high-tech IPOs are no more underpriced than other offerings.
C. Identification
The regression models in Tables V and VI assume that the effects of the bubble dummy variable and the other control variables can be separately identified. Consistent with this assumption, the (absolute) correlation between the bubble dummy and any of the ownership and selling characteristics never exceeds 0.175. Thus, it seems unlikely that the bubble dummy and the ownership and selling characteristics are essentially the same thing. As for the remaining control variables, the regressor that the bubble dummy correlates with the most is the size of the directed share programs (0.441). Given the dramatic rise in such programs over the period, this is not surprising, though it raises the question whether the effect of DSPs reported in Table VI is driven by the bubble years.
To shed further light on this, we have re-estimated the regression models during the pre-bubble years 1996-1998. Though not reported, we find that underpricing still increases in the size of directed share programs. The coefficient estimates vary from 0.006 to 0.007 across the various model specifications, and so are indistinguishable from the coefficient estimates reported in Table   VI . We also continue to find that underpricing is higher, the less equity VCs (p=0.01), investment banks (p=0.06) and corporates (p=0.05) hold, and the less VCs sell (p=0.025). The associated coefficients are not significantly different, as a group, from those reported in Table VI . Thus, there appears to be enough cross-sectional variation in the ownership and selling characteristics even in the earlier years to identify their effects on initial returns.
D. Omitted Variable Bias
It is conceivable that we have omitted a variable related to both underpricing and pre-IPO ownership structure and/or insider selling behavior, in which case the association we document could be driven by the omitted variable. For example, say the firms going public in 1999-2000
were more dependent on external capital before the IPO than companies going public in the earlier years. This may explain why firms in 1999-2000 were more frequently VC-backed, and why ownership was more fragmented in general. We find some support for this conjecture: companies that have lower revenues and fewer sales and that go public primarily to fund operating expenses, are associated with significantly more fragmented ownership (not reported). At the same time, such firms may have been inherently harder to value, leading to larger underpricing.
As this example illustrates, it is important to control for the type of firm going public. The variables we use for this purpose -use of proceeds, log age, and "new economy"-may not capture all dimensions of firm type. We have investigated three others -log sales, log assets, and pre-IPO profitability -but none of them is significant in the underpricing regressions. Including a full set of Fama-French (1997) industry effects instead of the "new economy' dummies does not alter or conclusions either, though in this specification several of the other control variables become considerably more significant.
V. Conclusion
The data and analysis presented in this paper illustrate that the aberrant pricing behavior witnessed during the dot-com bubble can be at least partially accounted for by marked changes in pre-IPO ownership structure and insider selling behavior over the same period. After controlling for these changes, the 1999-2000 period is noteworthy more for these changes than for the simple fact that valuations and underpricing simultaneously skyrocketed. We have not attempted to explain this massive restructuring of incentives.
It is conceivable that the firms going public during this period were fundamentally riskier or where high-quality firms distinguish themselves, and thereby build product market share, by incurring the indirect cost of underpricing and subjecting themselves to the scrutiny of secondary market investors engaged in costly information production. One prediction generated by the model is that high-quality firms in industries subject to network externalities are more likely to satisfy the necessary conditions for going public. These firms simultaneously will be characterized by higher insider equity retention. Loughran and Ritter (2001) . Age is IPO year minus founding date. We lack age data for three companies. Accounting data is from SDC. EPS data is hand-cleaned using S.E.C. filings, 10-Ks etc. We test the significance of the changes over time by regressing each characteristic on an annual time trend t, and report, in the last column, the significance level of the coefficient estimated for t. We use OLS to test for trends in means, median regressions to test for trends in medians, and probit regressions to test for trends in binary variables. We use *** , ** , and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Lack of significance is indicated as -. Tables I to IV . Models (1)-(4) are estimated using OLS. Model (6) is estimated using 2SLS, with (5) being the first stage. Standard errors are adjusted for time clustering by assuming that observations are independent for companies at different points in time, but not necessarily for companies which go public in the same month. They are more conservative than White (1980) standard errors. We use *** , ** , and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. The number of observations is 2,375. (We lack age data for three firms.)
1996
Column:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) The dependent variable in all regressions is the initial return (the first-day closing price relative to the offer price). The participation ratio is the number of secondary shares sold at the IPO normalized by the number of pre-IPO shares outstanding. The dilution factor is the number of primary shares issued normalized by the number of pre-IPO shares outstanding. Price revision + equals the price revision between the midpoint of the filing range and the final offer price if positive, and zero otherwise. All other regressors are defined as in Table V . The 2SLS regression in column (12) uses models (5) and (6) in Table V as its first-stage. Standard errors are adjusted for time clustering by assuming that observations are independent for companies at different points in time, but not necessarily for companies which go public in the same month. They are more conservative than White (1980) standard errors. We use *** , ** , and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. The number of observations is 2,375. (We lack age data for three firms.) (7) (8) 
